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Abstract
This study examines whether board tenure of directors on the independent audit
committee affects the effectiveness of the committee in oversight of financial reporting.
Using a larger size sample of 7,700 firm-year observations over the period 1998 to 2005 in
U.S., we document strong evidence that the proportion of long tenure directors on the
independent audit committee is negatively associated with earnings management. The
results are robust to several sensitivity analyses. Our findings further corroborate the notion
that long tenure directors have greater expertise and experience to effectively monitor
financial reporting process.
Keywords: Director Tenure, Independent Audit Committee, Earnings Management

1. Introduction
Audit committees play an important monitoring role in companies’ financial reporting process. Klein
(2002a) finds that higher proportion of outside directors on the audit committee (i.e., audit committee
independence) is associated with lower earnings management, suggesting that audit committee
independence reflects governance quality. However, this quality measure has become less practical in
U.S. since U.S. stock exchanges required that listed firms must have audit committees consisting solely
of outside directors (NYSE Corporate Governance 303A.05, NASDAQ Rule 4350 (c), and AMEX
Enhanced Corporate Governance Rules Sec 805). Moreover, directors may still differ in their
monitoring effectiveness even though they are all “outside” or “independent” directors. Thus, it is of
practical value to explore the quality difference between fully independent audit committees.
In addition to directors’ independence, Bedard, Chtourou, and Courteau (2004) suggest that
audit committee members’ other characteristics may affect audit committee effectiveness. They argue
that director board tenure may reflect monitoring effectiveness. On the one hand, directors with long
board tenure have greater knowledge and experience, thus resulting in higher monitoring effectiveness.
On the other hand, long tenure directors may be less effective because they are more likely to befriend
managers and are less likely to adequately monitor managers (Vafeas, 2003). Bedard et al. (2004)
examine whether audit committee members’ average board tenure is associated with earnings
management. They document marginally significant evidence that earnings management is lower when
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audit committee members have long board tenure. Since they use a small size sample of 300 firms in
1996 and their evidence is marginally significant, further research into the relationship between
director tenure and audit committee effectiveness is warranted.
To shed more light on this issue, this study employs a large size sample of 7,700 firm-year
observation over the period 1998 to 2005 in U.S. We provide strong evidence that earnings
management is negatively associated with the proportion of long tenure directors on the independent
audit committees. The results are robust to several additional analyses. Our findings are consistent with
the notion that long tenure directors are more effective in oversight of financial reporting because of
their greater expertise and experience.
This study extends the research on the effect of director tenure on audit committee governance
quality in the following two ways. First, we focus on independent audit committees. Unlike Bedard et
al. (2004), our sample firms have a fully independent audit committee, which is practically important
since audit committees of all U.S. firms have been required to be solely composed of independent
directors. Second, we use a larger size sample compared to previous studies on audit committee
effectiveness. Thus, our data analyses are more statistically powerful. Our evidence on the association
between director tenure and audit committee effectiveness will be more convincing. Overall, this study
contributes to the literature on audit committee effectiveness by providing more significant evidence
on the monitoring quality of long tenure directors. Moreover, our findings provide a more explicit
implication to corporate governance regulators that board tenure of independent directors may be
considered when audit committee composition is regulated.

2. Prior Research
The audit committee plays a key role in overseeing, monitoring, and advising the management and
outside auditors in preparing financial statements, conducting audits, and implementing internal
accounting control systems. Previous studies (e.g., Klein, 2002a) usually use the proportion of outside
directors on the audit committee (i.e., audit committee independence) to measure the quality of the
audit committee. Those studies suggest that the audit committee is more effective if more outside
directors are sitting on the committee.
Klein (2002a) examines whether audit committee independence is associated with earnings
management. She finds that audit committee independence is negatively related to abnormal accruals,
suggesting that audit committees structured to be more independent of the management are more
effective in constraining earnings management. In addition to audit committee independence, Bedard et
al. (2004) examine whether audit committee expertise affects earnings management. They measure
audit committee expertise with respect to three aspects: financial, governance, and firm-specific
expertise. Using a sample of 300 U.S. firms classified into three groups: one with aggressive incomeincreasing earnings management, one with aggressive income-decreasing earnings management, and
one with low levels of earnings management in the year 1996, they find that the financial and
governance expertise of audit committee members are negatively associated with the likelihood of
aggressive earnings management. Moreover, they find that audit committee independence is negatively
related to the likelihood of aggressive earnings management.
Prior research also investigates the association between audit committee characteristics and
financial reporting quality not directly measured in earnings management. Abbott, Parker, and Peters
(2004) examine the association of 88 financial restatements in the period 1991 to 1999 with audit
committee characteristics. They find that the likelihood of financial restatement is less for firms with
higher audit committee independence and more audit committee meetings. Farber (2005) explores
audit committee characteristics of 87 firms identified by the SEC as fraudulently manipulating their
financial statements. He finds that the fraud firms have lower audit committee expertise and fewer
audit committee meetings compared to the control firms.
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Previous studies also suggest that audit committee characteristics affect audit quality, thus
enhancing financial reporting quality. Carcello and Neal (2000) examine the impact of audit committee
quality on the issuance of auditors’ going concern reports. They find that the auditor is more likely to
issue a going-concern report for firms experiencing financial distress if the firms have higher audit
committee independence. DeZoort and Salterio (2001) investigate whether audit committee members’
experience and knowledge affect their judgements in auditor-corporate management conflict situations.
They find that audit committee members with greater experience and greater accounting knowledge are
more likely to support an auditor in disputes with the management. Abbott, Parker, Peters, and
Raghunandan (2003) examine the association between audit committee characteristics and audit fees.
They find that audit fees are positively associated with audit committee characteristics such as
independence and financial expertise, suggesting that those characteristics can influence the level of
audit coverage and thereafter audit quality.
Moreover, there is extant research into the relationship between audit committee characteristics
and corporate disclosure quality. Karamanou and Vafeas (2005) examine whether audit committee
structures are related to the voluntary disclosure of management earnings forecasts. They find that
managers are more likely to issue or update earnings forecasts when firms have more effective audit
committee structures. Mangena and Pike (2005) examine whether audit committee characteristics
affect the level of disclosure in interim reports of 262 U.K. listed companies. They find that audit
committee financial expertise exerts a positive impact on the level of interim disclosure.
In summary, prior research focuses on audit committee independence and financial expertise
while investigating audit committee effectiveness. There is limited research on the relationship
between audit committee members’ board tenure and audit committee effectiveness.

3. Hypotheses Development
3.1. Effectiveness of Long Tenure
There is a large body of research into the effect of work experience on job performance in the literature
(Quinones, Ford, and Teachout, 1995). Experience is the job-relevant knowledge gained over time
(Fiedler, 1970). Hunter and Hunter (1984) find a correlation of 0.18 between work experience and job
performance based on a meta-analysis. Using path analysis, Schmidt, Hunter, and Outerbridge (1986)
show that work experience plays an important role in predicting job performance. McDaniel, Schmidt,
and Hunter (1988) document a mean corrected correlation of 0.32 between work experience and job
performance across a number of occupations. Those studies suggest that work experience can improve
job performance. In addition, time on the job or tenure is used to measure work experience in most
studies (Quinones et al., 1995).
Board directors should act in good faith in the interests of the company. Outside directors play
an important role in monitoring the management as they are not affiliated with the company. They
need to exercise the judgments on issues coming before the board or committee. Those issues include
accounting treatments. Procedural knowledge means by the knowledge of the steps involved in actually
performing a task, such as solving a particular type of problem or analyzing a particular issue.
Since procedure knowledge is important in dealing with accounting issues (Herz and Schultz,
1999), outside directors’ job performance of monitoring accounting and auditing will involve the
acquisition of procedure knowledge. Procedural knowledge can be learned "on-the-job", and is more
likely to increase as a result of work experience (Quinones et al., 1995). Thus, outside directors acquire
the procedural knowledge through performing the task of monitoring financial reporting process over
time.
The effectiveness of the board or committee (including in particular the role played by outside
directors) is dependent to a substantial content on the usefulness of the information that directors
receive. Outside directors are less informed than inside directors (Bhagat and Black, 2002). Over time,
outside directors can gain much knowledge of the company’s internal control system and business

International Research Journal of Finance and Economics - Issue 51 (2010)

179

operations. Furthermore, outside directors may also establish working relationships with the
management and, through those relationships, acquire more useful information for their judgements on
accounting issues.
Long tenure directors may have high reputation developed over time. Those directors are likely
to pay more attention to the job performance as the poor performance will dramatically impair their
reputational capitals. In addition, directors who survive long tenure must perform well if the job market
of directors is efficient (Vafeas, 2003).
Previous studies (e.g., Salancik, 1977; O’Reilly and Caldwell, 1981) suggest that directors’
organizational commitment increases in tenure. Salancik (1977) develops a theory that people’s actions
become more committing if the revocability of the actions is lower. Furthermore, O’Reilly and
Caldwell (1981) provide evidence that behavioural commitment is significantly associated with job
turnover. Long tenure directors may have high job satisfactions. Those directors are less likely to
reverse their job acceptance. Thus, extended director tenure can enhance the commitment of directors
to fulfil their duties.
In summary, long tenure directors have greater experience, expertise, and reputation. Also, they
have high commitment and willingness to work better. If an independent audit committee has more
long tenure directors, the committee is more effective in constraining earnings management. Thus, we
develop the following hypothesis:
H1: Independent audit committees with more long tenure directors are more effective in
constraining earnings management than those with fewer long tenure directors.
3.2. Ineffectiveness of Long Tenure
On the other hand, long board tenure may lead to the entrenchment that reduces the effectiveness of
outside directors. Long tenure directors are more likely to have a friendly relationship with the
management, which is developed over time (Vafeas, 2003). Studies by Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker
(2002) and Bebchuk and Fried (2003) suggest that the management may use their power to influence
the nomination process of directors. Outside directors with strong personal ties with the management
are more likely to be re-appointed and survive long term. Those directors will cease to operate
independently, as said by Richard Koppes, former general counsel of CalPERS, “It is easier for a
longer-tenured director to begin to operate as an insider” (Canavan, Jones, and Potter, 2004). Thus, the
independence of outside directors may decrease in board tenure.
Long tenure directors are less mobile and less employable (Vafeas, 2003). They lack new
insights and solutions to the company’s issues (Canavan et al., 2004). As business operations are
becoming more complex and changing more rapidly, it is increasingly difficult for long tenure
directors to keep abreast of changes to technology, financial dealings, and business strategies. New
directors can bring fresh ideas and critical thinking to the board or committee. However, long tenure
directors may lack talent to deal with new issues.
Based on the above arguments, long tenure directors are likely to be ineffective. Whether the
effectiveness of long tenure dominates its ineffectiveness is an empirical issue. Thus, we develop the
following hypothesis opposite to H1:
H2: Independent audit committees with more long tenure directors are less effective in
constraining earnings management than those with fewer long tenure directors.

4. Research Design
4.1. Sample Selection
The sample selection begins by searching the version of IRRC Directors’ database updated in
November 2006 for U.S. companies with audit committees consisting solely of outside directors. We
focus on independent audit committees because we want to examine quality differences among
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independent audit committees resulting from the tenure of outside directors. Based on the information
of audit committee membership and director affiliations provided by IRRC, we identify a raw sample
of 8,820 firm-year observations with independent audit committees from the population of 12,968
firms over the period 1998 to 2005. The IRRC determination of affiliated directors (i.e., not
independent directors) is that “IRRC generally considers any director affiliated who is a former
employee; is an employee of or is a service provider, supplier, customer; is a recipient of charitable
funds; is considered an interlocking or designated director; or is a family member of a director or
executive”. The IRRC determination is close to the determinations of affiliated directors in U.S. stock
exchanges’ codes including NYSE Corporate Governance 303A.05, NASDAQ Rule 4350 (c), and
AMEX Enhanced Corporate Governance Rules Sec 805 that became effective in later 2003. We use
1998 to 2005 as the sample period for tests because 1998 is the first year for which the IRRC provides
audit committee membership data and 2005 is the latest data year of that version of IRRC Directors’
database. We collect the data of directors’ board service time, shareholding, audit committee size, and
board independence from IRRC Directors. We also collect the data from Compustat database to
compute financial variables. After excluding the observations with missing data, we reduce the sample
size to 7,700 firm-year observations over the period 1998 to 2005.
Table 1:

Sample Breakdown

Panel A. By year
Year
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Total

Frequency
802
834
929
1,066
903
1,000
1,076
1,090
7,700

Percent (%)
10.42
10.83
12.06
13.84
11.73
12.99
13.97
14.16
100.00

Panel B. By industry
Industry
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing
Mining
Construction
Manufacturing
Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, and Sanitary Services
Wholesale Trade
Retail Trade
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
Services
Public Administration
Total

Frequency
13
298
80
3,760
923
287
654
482
1,184
19
7,700

Percent (%)
0.17
3.87
1.04
48.83
11.99
3.73
8.49
6.26
15.38
0.25
100.00

Table 1, panel A presents that the sample observations are evenly distributed over years. Table
2, panel B reports the distribution of the observations across industries. I find that the manufacturing
(48.8%), services (15.4%), transportation, communication, electric, gas, and sanitary services (12.0%),
retail trade (8.5%), and finance, insurance, and real estate (6.3%) are the most widely represented
industries in the sample. We find the similar results if the observations in finance industry are
excluded.
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4.2. Measurement of Earnings Management
Discretionary accruals are commonly used to examine earnings management in the literature. Like
prior research (e.g., Klein, 2002a; Chung and Kallapur, 2003), this study measures earnings
management based on discretionary accruals. First, we estimate a cross-sectional variant of the Jones
(1991) model using observations in each two-digit SIC industry-year:
ACC/TA-1 = a0 1/TA-1 + a1 ∆SALES/TA-1 + a2 PPE/TA-1 + e
(1)
where
ACC = total accruals measured as the difference between earnings before extraordinary items
and discontinued operations and cash from operations,
TA-1 = total assets at the beginning of the year,
∆SALES = change in sales between year t-1 and year t,
PPE = gross property, plant, and equipment.
Like Klein (2002a), we use all firm-year observations on Compustat over the period 1998 to
2005 and estimate the parameters in equation (1) for each two-digit SIC industry-year in which there
are at least eight firms. Discretionary accruals for the sample observations are estimated as the residual
values from model (1).
Second, we adjust estimated discretionary accruals by controlling for the impact of
performance on the estimates. Following Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005), we match each firm-year
observation in the sample with a firm-year observation from the population with the same two-digit
SIC industry-year and the closest return on assets (ROA). The performance-matched discretionary
accrual for each sample observation is computed as the discretionary accrual of the observation minus
the discretionary accrual of the matched observation. We use the performance-matched approach to
adjust discretionary accruals because Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005) show that the performancematched discretionary accruals are less misspecified than other measures of discretionary accruals.
Finally, the absolute value of the performance-matched discretionary accruals is used to
measure earnings management. Like prior research (e.g., Klein, 2002a; Chung and Kallapur, 2003), we
take the absolute value for the measurement as the management manipulates earnings downward as
well as upward (Levitt, 1998).
4.3. Regression Model
We estimate the following regression model to test the hypotheses:
ADAC = β0 + β1LTNDIR + β2BLKDIR + β3ACMSIZE + β4BODIND + β5MB + β6ACNI +
β7DEBT + β8SIZE + β9NEGNI + Year Dummies + ε
(2)
where
= the absolute value of performance-matched discretionary accruals based on the Jones
model,
LTNDIR
= the proportion of long tenure directors on the independent audit committee, where long
tenure directors are directors with the board tenure of 10 or more years,
BLKDIR
= the proportion of block shareholding directors on the independent audit committee,
where block shareholding directors are directors who hold 5% or more of the firm’s
common equity,
ACMSIZE = audit committee size, measured as the number of directors on the audit committee,
BODIND = board independence, measured as the proportion of independent directors on the board,
MB
= the market-to-book ratio, measured by the ratio of the market value of the common
equity to the book value of the common equity,
ACNI
= the absolute value of the change in net income between year t-1 and year t, deflated by
the total assets,
DEBT
= the ratio of long-term debt to total assets,
SIZE
= the log of total assets,
NEGNI
= a dummy coded 1 if net income is negative for both year t-1 and year t, and 0
otherwise.

ADAC
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We define long tenure directors by using 10 years of board service time as the cut-off point
because this level is close to the average tenure of directors on the audit committee. BLKDIR is
included in model (2) because directors with high stock ownership may have stronger incentives to
monitor the management (Shivdasani and Yermack, 1999). Moreover, Klein (2002a) documents some
evidence that an outside block shareholder sitting on the audit committee can constrain earnings
management. We add audit committee size (ACMSIZE) to model (2) as previous studies on board size
suggest that audit committee size may affect audit committee effectiveness. For instance, Bushman,
Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004) argue that smaller size boards have the disadvantage of fewer advisors
and monitors of management. Agrawal and Knoeber (1999) advocate larger size boards in firms where
information is otherwise difficult to obtain. These studies suggest that larger audit committees could be
more effective. It is also probably more difficult for managers to exert influence over a large
committee. On the other hand, Jensen (1993) argues that in the context of boards of directors, larger
boards can be ineffective because of higher cooperation costs and more free riding, suggesting that
larger audit committees could be less effective. We control for the effect of board governance on audit
committee effectiveness by including board independence (BODIND) in model (2). Board
independence is commonly used as a measure of board governance quality in the literature (e.g., Klein,
2002b; Boone, Field, Karpoff, and Raheja, 2007).
We also include several additional variables in model (2) to control for the factors that may
affect the absolute value of discretionary accruals or audit committee effectiveness. We include MB
because Klein (2002b) provides evidence that audit committee independence is related to the marketto-book ratio and Skinner and Sloan (2002) suggest that growth firms, proxied by high market-to-book
ratio, are more likely to manage earnings. We include ACNI and DEBT because previous studies (e.g.,
Dechow, Sloan, Sweeney, 1996; Klein, 2002a) find that those variables are positively associated with
earnings management. We include SIZE because political costs, proxied by firm size, are negatively
associated with earnings management (Cahan, 2002). Furthermore, Klein (2002b) shows that firm size
and negative earnings dummy (NEGNI) affect audit committee independence. Thus, we also include
NEGNI. Finally, we include year dummies in model (2) to control for fixed year effects.
We estimate model (2) on pooled cross-sectional, time series data. We expect a negative
(positive) and significant coefficient for β1 if H1 (H2) is supported. In addition, we expect a negative
coefficient for β2, β3, β4, and β8, and a positive coefficient for β5, β6, β7, and β9.

5. Empirical Results
Table 2 reports the tenure characteristics of directors on the independent audit committees. The average
tenure of outside directors is 9.54 years. 35.41% of the outside directors have at least 10 years’ board
service time. 9.37% of the outside directors have at least 20 years’ board service time.
Table 2:

Tenure Characteristics of Independent Directors

Total number of independent director-year observations
Average tenure of independent directors (years)
Percent of directors with 10 or more years' tenure
Percent of directors with 20 or more years' tenure

27,343
9.54
35.41%
9.37%

Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of variables. The mean and median of the absolute
value of performance-matched discretionary accruals (ADAC) are 0.098 and 0.062, respectively. The
average proportion of long tenure directors (with board service time of at least 10 years) on the audit
committee is 27.3%. The average proportion of block shareholding directors (with the shareholding of
at least 5% of the common equity) is 0.5%. The average audit committee size is 3.55 members. The
average proportion of independent directors on the board is 70.4% for firms with the independent audit
committee.
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Table 3:
Variable
ADAC
LTNDIR
BLKDIR
ACMSIZE
BODIND
MB
ACNI
DEBT
SIZE
NEGNI

Descriptive Statistics
N
7,700
7,700
7,700
7,700
7,700
7,700
7,700
7,700
7,700
7,700

Mean
0.098
0.273
0.005
3.550
0.704
3.102
0.052
0.196
7.429
0.094

Median
0.062
0.250
0.000
3.000
0.727
2.164
0.023
0.185
7.271
0.000

Std
0.109
0.283
0.042
1.086
0.150
3.469
0.085
0.166
1.531
0.291

Q1
0.028
0.000
0.000
3.000
0.600
1.452
0.009
0.034
6.302
0.000

Q3
0.125
0.500
0.000
4.000
0.833
3.593
0.055
0.307
8.383
0.000

Table 4 provides the Pearson correlations between independent variables. The correlation
coefficient between LTNDIR and BODIND is significantly negative, suggesting that long tenure
directors on the audit committee may substitute to board governance. The negative correlations of
LTNDIR with MB, DEBT, and NEGNI suggest that long tenure directors are less likely to sit on the
audit committee of firms with high growth, high financial leverage, or negative earnings. The
maximum absolute value among the correlation coefficients is 0.38 between ACMSIZE and BODIND.
Since the correlations between the independent variables are not excessive, multicollinearity is unlikely
to be a substantive issue.
Table 4:

Pearson Correlations (N=7,700)

Variable
BLKDIR ACMSIZE BODIND
MB
ACNI
DEBT
SIZE
LTNDIR
0.004
0.007
-0.059***
-0.042***
-0.081***
-0.028**
-0.004
BLKDIR
-0.045***
-0.025**
0.016
0.043***
-0.008
-0.089***
ACMSIZE
0.379***
-0.008
-0.175***
0.085***
0.377***
BODIND
0.010
-0.061***
0.066***
0.185***
MB
0.093***
-0.082***
0.008
ACNI
-0.058***
-0.226***
DEBT
0.238***
SIZE
Notes: *** and ** indicate a significance at the level of 1%, and 5%, respectively (two-tailed tests).

NEGNI
-0.033***
0.038***
-0.112***
-0.024**
-0.066***
0.288***
0.079***
-0.154***

Table 5 contains the results of the regression that examines the effect of director tenure on the
effectiveness of the independent audit committee in constraining earnings management. We find a
negative and significant coefficient for LTNDIR (t-statistic = -3.48), consistent (inconsistent) with H1
(H2). Thus, the independent audit committee with high proportion of long tenure directors is more
effective in constraining earnings management than that with a low proportion of long tenure directors.
This suggests that the expertise side of long director tenure overwhelmingly dominates its management
friendliness side at the level of audit committee governance. These results are consistent with those in
the Beasley (1996)’s study that the likelihood of financial statement fraud decreases as outside director
tenure on the board increases. On the other hand, my results are inconsistent with the Vafeas (2003)’s
argument that long tenure directors are more affiliated and then less effective.
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Effect of Director Tenure on Independent Audit Committee Effectiveness

Variable
Predicted sign
Coefficient
Intercept
?
0.115
LTNDIR
-/+
-0.015
BLKDIR
0.036
ACMSIZE
-0.003
BODIND
-0.001
MB
+
0.002
ACNI
+
0.284
DEBT
+
-0.030
SIZE
-0.004
NEGNI
+
0.037
N
F-statistic
Adj. R2
Notes: *** indicates a significance at the level of 1% (two-tailed tests).

t-statistic
13.08***
-3.48***
1.25
-2.66***
-0.08
6.89***
18.86***
-4.00***
-4.03***
8.44***
7,700
58.49***
10.67%

In Table 5, we also find a negative and significant coefficient for ACMSIZE, suggesting that
large audit committees are more effective in constraining earnings management. Consistent with
previous studies (e.g., Klein, 2002a), we find that the absolute value of discretionary accruals is
positively associated with MB, ACNI, or NEGNI, and negatively associated with SIZE. Thus, firms
with high growth, high change in earnings, or negative earnings are more likely to manage earnings,
whereas large firms are less likely to engage in earnings management. However, we find a negative
coefficient for DEBT, which is inconsistent with the Klein (2002a) findings that high financial leverage
firms are more likely to manipulate earnings.
We also conduct several additional analyses as follows. First, we examine whether the results
are sensitive to using discretionary accruals computed by the following modified Jones model
(Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995):
ACC/TA-1 = a0 1/TA-1 + a1 (∆SALES – ∆REC) /TA-1 + a2 PPE/TA-1 + e
(3)
where
∆REC = change in receivables between year t-1 and year t.
The Jones model is modified by adjusting the change in sales revenue for the change in account
receivables as if the change in account receivables arises from earnings management. Table 6 reports
the results when we use the performance-matched discretionary accruals based on the modified Jones
model. We still find a negative and significant coefficient for LTNDIR (t-statistic = - 3.26). Likewise,
the results support H1 but not H2.
Table 6:

Results Based on the Modified Jones Model

Variable
Predicted sign
Coefficient
Intercept
?
0.119
LTNDIR
-/+
-0.014
BLKDIR
0.026
ACMSIZE
-0.003
BODIND
-0.012
MB
+
0.002
ACNI
+
0.294
DEBT
+
-0.029
SIZE
-0.003
NEGNI
+
0.039
N
F-statistic
Adj. R2
Notes: *** and ** indicate a significance at the level of 1% and 5%, respectively (two-tailed tests).

t-statistic
12.77***
-3.26***
0.90
-2.11**
-1.29
6.37***
18.84***
-3.59***
-3.51***
8.60***
7,442
57.40***
10.82%
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Table 7:

Results on An Alternative Measure of Long Tenure Director

Variable
Predicted sign
Coefficient
Intercept
?
0.112
LTNDIR
-/ +
-0.023
BLKDIR
0.037
ACMSIZE
-0.003
BODIND
0.000
MB
+
0.002
ACNI
+
0.285
DEBT
+
-0.030
SIZE
-0.004
NEGNI
+
0.036
N
F-statistic
Adj. R2
Notes: *** indicates a significance at the level of 1% (two-tailed tests).

t-statistic
12.86***
-2.71***
1.29
-2.67***
0.03
6.91***
18.98***
-3.94***
-4.06***
8.41***
7,700
58.15***
10.62%

Second, the documented dominance of long tenure directors’ expertise over their amiable
relationships with the management could be due to the shorter cut-off point of 10 years used to identify
long tenure directors. As the cut-off point of long tenure moves up, it is likely that the management
friendliness side of long tenure directors may dominate its expertise side. This is because the expertise
of long tenure directors may be a learning curve of director tenure (Katz, 1982). To mitigate this
concern, we retest the hypotheses by increasing the cut-off point. Like Vafeas (2003), we define long
tenure directors as those who served the board for 20 or more years. Table 7 presents evidence that the
coefficient on LTNDIR is negative and significant (t-statistic = -2.71) when the cut-off point for long
director tenure is increased to 20 years of board service time. These results suggest that the dominance
of long tenure directors’ expertise is still evident.
Third, some audit committee or board structure metrics in model (2) may be endogenous. Since
this study focuses on director tenure, we test the hypotheses again by allowing for the endogeneity of
director tenure. We re-estimate model (2) using a two-stage regression procedure similar to a procedure
used by Frankel, Kothari, and Weber (2006). The first-stage regression involves modelling the
determinants of the proportion of long tenure directors on the audit committee (i.e., LTNDIR). Based
on prior research on the determinants of audit committee composition (e.g., Klein, 2002b), we include
the market-to-book ratio, firm size, negative earnings dummy, and board independence in the firststage regression. We also include the portfolio rank of LTNDIR (i.e., LTNDIR_RANK) in the first-stage
model. We add LTNDIR_RANK in the first-stage model because endogeneity is likely to affect the
variation in LTNDIR rather than the level of LTNDIR (e.g., Greene, 2000). Hentschel and Kothari
(2001) note that a relatively crude measure of the endogenous variable can be used as an instrumental
variable because it is likely to capture the level of the variable but not the endogenously determined
variations around those levels. We rank firm-year observations by LTNDIR and then categorize them
into three equal-sized portfolios. LTNDIR_RANK is measured by 0, 1 or 2 for firms in the lowest,
middle or highest portfolio, respectively. Thus, we model the determinants of long tenure directors as
follows:
LTNDIR = µ 0 + µ 1MB +µ 2SIZE +µ 3NEGNI+ µ 4BODIND +µ 5LTNDIR_RANK + e (Model 4)
After estimating model (4), the second stage regression (i.e., model (2)) is run using the fitted
value of LTNDIR from model (4). Table 8 reports the results after controlling for the endogeneity of
director tenure. We still find that the absolute value of discretionary accruals is negatively associated
with the proportion of long tenure directors on the audit committee (t-statistic = -3.21), consistent with
H1.
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Table 8:
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Results after Allowing for Endogeneity

Variable
Predicted sign
Coefficient
Intercept
?
0.115
LTMDIR
-0.015
BLKDIR
0.036
ACMSIZE
-0.003
BODIND
-0.002
MB
+
0.002
ACNI
+
0.285
DEBT
+
-0.030
SIZE
-0.004
NEGNI
+
0.037
N
F-statistic
Adj. R2
Notes: *** and ** indicate a significance at the level of 1% and 5%, respectively (two-tailed tests).

t-statistic
13.04***
-3.21***
1.25
-2.36**
-0.18
6.88***
18.93***
-3.97***
-4.10***
8.44***
7,700
58.36***
10.65%

Fourth, we examine whether the results hold after two more audit committee structure metrics,
i.e., the proportion of directors who have at least three board seats of other firms and the proportion of
directors who are the CEO of other firms, are added in equation (2). Like long tenure directors,
directors with more additional directorships and directors with CEO title may have greater expertise.
Directors who serve on many boards have reputations as effective monitors (Shivdasani and Yermack,
1999). Previous studies (e.g., Shivdasani, 1993; Brickley, Linck, and Coles, 1999; Coles and Hoi,
2003) provide evidence that directors with more board seats are more effective. Similarly, CEO
directors may have more experience and knowledge about business operations.
Also like long tenure directors, directors with more additional directorships and directors with
CEO title may be less effective. Directors with more additional directorships are too busy to monitor
the management. Core, Holthausen, and Larcker (1999) and Fich and Shivdasani (2006) find that those
directors have lower monitoring effectiveness. Since CEOs are a relatively homogenous, cohesive
collection of individuals (e.g., Useem, 1984), the presence of CEOs from other firms on the audit
committee may result in a general propensity to support the CEO when deciding on accounting
treatments (e.g., Lorsch and MacIver, 1989; Daily, Johnson, Ellstrand, and Dalton, 1998). Thus, CEO
directors may be less likely to preclude earnings management.
We re-run model (2) by including the two audit committee metrics, i.e., the proportion of
directors with more additional directorships and the proportion of CEO directors. Untabulated results
show that the coefficient is still negative and significant for LTNDIR, but insignificant for the two
added variables. These results suggest that the effect of LTNDIR dominates the effect of the two added
metrics that may reflect a certain extent of directors’ expertise.
Fifth, we examine whether long tenure directors are equally effective in constraining both
upward and downward earnings management. We use signed discretionary accruals as the dependent
variable in model (2) and run the regression separately for observations with positive or negative
discretionary accruals. Of 7,700 firm-year observations, 3,454 and 4,246 observations have positive
and negative performance-matched discretionary accruals, respectively, suggesting that “cookie-jar
accounting” is pervasive in practice (Levitt, 1998). We find that the coefficient on LTNDIR is negative
but insignificant when earnings are manipulated upward, whereas the coefficient on LTNDIR is
positive and significant when earnings are manipulated downward. Thus, firms manage earnings less
downward if they have more long-term directors sitting on the audit committee.
Finally, we estimate model (2) using yearly observations from 1998 to 2005 to control for the
potential autocorrelations of time-series data. We find that the coefficient on LTNDIR is negative for
seven of the eight annual regressions, of which the coefficient is significant for four regressions.
Overall, these results are consistent with H1 rather than H2.
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6. Conclusion
This study examines whether board tenure of directors on the independent audit committee affects the
effectiveness of the committee in constraining earnings management. We document strong evidence
that the proportion of long tenure directors on the independent audit committee is negatively associated
with earnings management, suggesting that independent audit committee members with long board
tenure have greater expertise and experience to effectively oversee financial reporting. Our results are
robust to various sensitivity tests. This study provides the following contributions to the literature.
First, this study adds to the literature by considering board tenure of directors on the independent audit
committee. Focusing on independent audit committees is of practical value. Second, this study employs
a larger size sample over a longer period than other studies on audit committees. We document more
convincing evidence that director tenure affects audit committee effectiveness.
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